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Loosen the Shackles on Pennsylvania Local
Government's Hiring Authority: An Argument for
Banding
United States taxpayers annually devote $500 billion to
government employees' salaries, and no doubt Pennsylvania's public
servants account for a sizable percentage of that sum.' Alas, not
even a resource pool this vast can prevent the frequently bemoaned
conclusion that government fails to provide services efficiently and
2
effectively.
Pennsylvania government's statutory-based hiring practices,
referred to as civil service, are a major source of government's
reputation for substandard performance and, in fact, make such a
reputation inevitable. This comment argues that Pennsylvania
government units will be better able to meet the public's needs if
the legislature will adapt the civil service hiring laws to more
modem workplace practices. The conclusion calls not for a drastic
change that ignores the commonwealth's long tradition of merit
public employment, but for a moderate alteration, banding, that will
enable government to provide services proficiently while protecting
taxpayers from the inefficiencies and dangers associated with
unqualified public employees.
This comment first discusses the rise of civil service. It then
examines Pennsylvania civil service hiring practices and modem
workplace competencies. Finally, it introduces banding and
illustrates how this technique satisfies the public's call for
increased effectiveness and fair play.
A government official's proper level of discretion in hiring has
been the subject of debate since the earliest days of the United
States.3 Echoing a practice already entrenched in state government
1. David Osborne & Peter Plastrik, Civil Action, THE WASHINGTON POST, JUNE 8, 1997, at
Magazine W8.
2. Hard Truths/Tough Choices, THE F Rsr REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
STATE AND LOCAL PUBIC SERVICE, William F. Winter, Chairman, 1993, at 1-8. (state and local
government retain procedures that are incapable of addressing modern capacity and
performance demands).
3. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), a matter involving judicial
appointments. At issue was the distinction between a government official's discretionary
authority and mandated obligation. Id. at 165-67.

445

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 37:445

(and in effect at the federal level 4), Andrew Jackson introduced the
"spoils" system to the federal level in 1828, and presidential
successors, regardless of political affiliations, continued the
practice of awarding government positions to political supporters.5
The debate that this practice generated involved rhetoric that one
would not be surprised to read in a modern newspaper. The
pro-spoils camp supported patronage hiring by citing increased
participation in government, focus on the electorate's mandate (i.e.,
only those tied to the administration could achieve the president's
platform), and lessened corruption. The anti-spoils camp
campaigned for a government workforce free from administration
control and thus better able to provide efficient and fair service.6
The assassination of President James Garfield hastened the
debate to a dramatic conclusion. Applying the spoils system,
Garfield had excluded an office seeker. The disgruntled man shot
the president and, in doing so, provided so strong a rallying point
for the anti-spoils faction as to produce the nation's first federal
merit employment law, 7 the Pendelton Act. 8 Civil service has
dictated federal government hiring procedures ever since.
Pennsylvania enacted public sector merit employment acts after
the federal legislature passed the Pendelton Act. Prior to civil
service laws, Pennsylvania local government employment was a
function of local executive nomination and local assembly consent.9
However, early in the twentieth century, the governor and the
legislature joined a national groundswell calling for greater
government effectiveness and less corruption. By passing various
civil service acts, the commonwealth became one of the earlier
4. See Robert Martanto, Thinking the Unthinkable in Public Administration:A Case
for Spoils in the FederalBureaucracy, 29 ADMINSTRATION AND SocIETY 623, January, 1998.
5. For a more detailed study of patronage employment the development of the federal
civil service system, See Developments in the Law, 97 HAv. L REv. 1611 (1984). See also H.
Manley Case, Federal Employee Job Rights: The Pendelton Act of 1883 to the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, 29 How. UJ. 283 (1986).
6. See Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 1626-28.
7. Id. at 1627-28.
8. Act of January 16, 1883; 22 STAT. 403. See Case, supra note 2, at 287-88.
9. For example, Article 2, section 4 of the previous Third Class Cities Act, Act of May
23, 1889, RL 299, outlined the following procedure for police appointment:
Council shall fix by ordinance the number, rank and compensation of the members of
the city police force, and prescribe all necessary rules and regulations for the
organization and government thereof... The mayor shall nominate, and by and with
the advice and consent of the select council appoint, suspend or dismiss the said
policemen, any or all of them, and in like manner all vacancies shall be filled.
See Commonwealth v. Black, 50 A. 1008 (Pa. 1902).
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states to legislate merit-based government appointments. 10
The Pennsylvania Legislature's first major step toward civil
service focused on Philadelphia. In 1906, Pennsylvania's governor
called an extraordinary legislative session to address, among other
matters, Philadelphia government appointment practices.1 ' In a
subsequent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, President Judge
Sulzberger summarized the necessity of the extraordinary session:
[A]n opinion had come to be generally held by the people of
the Commonwealth, and of this city, that the power of
appointment conferred upon directors of the various
departments was in danger of being used to strengthen the
power of the political party of which a director for the time
being might be an adherent, instead of being exercised with an
12
eye single to the interests of the whole public.
The special legislative session produced The Shern Law, which
established a civil service system in cities of the first class and, as
a result, mandatory merit-based appointments to routine positions
3
(based on fitness and qualifications).
The current Philadelphia civil service law (the "First Class Cities
Act") is a more detailed, more protective act than was its Shern
Law predecessor. 4 Enacted in 1919, the current act embodies the
legislature's intention to attract and retain competent employees
regardless of their political or religious affiliations, so long as those
employees perform adequately. 5 The act provides for distinguished
10. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Public Policy: "We Don't Want Anybody Anybody Sent":
The Death of Political Patronage Hiring In Chicago, 86 NW. U.L REv. 57, 60-63, 1991.
Professor Bowman notes that patronage hiring has roots in ancient China and credits the
Progressives and journalists with bringing the matter to the public's attention. In addition,
"lawyers, editors, clergyman, professors, and businessmen whose interests were mercantile
and financial rather than industrial" also contributed to the reform movement. Developments
in the Law, supra note 5, at 1626-27.
11. Duffy v. Cooke, 86 A. 1076 (Pa. 1913).
12. Id.
13. Id. The Act of February 15, 1906 (PL. 19) further required just cause dismissals.
For legislative purposes, Pennsylvania divides its cities into four classes: first class cities
have populations of at least one million; second class cities have populations of at least two
hundred and fifty thousand and fewer than one million; second class-A cities have
populations of at least eighty thousand and fewer than two hundred and fifty thousand; third
class cities also have populations of at least eighty thousand and fewer than two hundred
and fifty thousand but do not choose second-class A status. General Municipal Law,
Classification of Cities, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (1997).
14. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 12621-12647 (1998).
15. Leary v. Philadelphia, 172 A. 459, 463 (Pa. 1934) (citing Essinger v. New Castle, 119
A. 479, 480 (Pa. 1923)).
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employment
classes,1 6 rule-making
authority, '7 just cause
8
1
9
dismissal,' and merit testing.
Shortly after passing the original civil service law (which applied
only to first class cities), the Pennsylvania legislature extended
merit employment to smaller cities. On the heels of the
consolidation of the separate cities of Allegheny and Pittsburgh into
what is presently the city of Pittsburgh, 0 the legislature enacted the
General Civil Service Act for cities of the second class.2' The act's
purpose is familiar to reformers: "securing legislation to protect
honest and capable employees and to improve the service by
establishing a set of requirements which would ensure that new
employees would be capable of fulfilling the duties of their
position."z2 The provisions are similar to those of the First Class
City Act because they identify employment classes,23 authorize civil
25
service commission rule making,24 and require just-cause dismissal
and merit testing. 2 Third class cities gained civil service in 193127

and second class-A cities followed in

1943.28

Thus, in the battle between proponents of spoils and proponents
of merit, the Pennsylvania legislature awarded victory to the latter
by enveloping all cities within civil service systems. Although they
differ by class of city, the merit laws share similar principles. Key
among these similarities are classification of positions and
requirements of appointment.
Aware that not all job types are alike, the legislature identified
several classifications of positions. Each law designates a
16. The Act divides first class city employees into the following classifications:
competitive; exempt; and labor. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. at § 12627 (1998).
17. The Act authorizes the civil service commission to adopt rules concerning, among

other matters, application rejection, former employee reinstatement, position transfer, public
advertisement, and eligibility list creation. TItle 53, § 12633.
18. The Act specifically requires just cause for dismissal and provides discharged and
disciplined employees with the right to a public hearing. Title 53, § 12638.
19. TItle 53, § 12634.
20. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
21. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 23431-23462 (1998).
22. Samuel B. Griffith, First Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission of the City
of Pittsburgh, 1908, at 1.
23. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. at § 23443.
24. Title 53, § 23440.
25. Title 53, § 23453.
26. Title 53, §§ 23441, 23455.
27. 53 PA_ CONS. STAT. §§ 39401-39410 (1998).
28. 53 PA CONS. STAT. §§ 30451-30475 (1998). This comment focuses on the first class
and second class laws. Note that the topics discussed herein, including banding, apply
equally to second class-A and third class cities.
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competitive class of positions that requires appointments to follow
practical examinations to distinguish candidates' merit. 29 The laws
further recognize that not all government positions are amenable to
distinguishing candidates by competitive examination. Thus, civil
service laws allot both first and second class cities certain
"exempt" positions and jobs that include duties and responsibilities
that do not lend themselves to testing and therefore require no
qualifying examination.3° By limiting the initial number of exempt
titles and requiring a hiring authority to show cause at a public
hearing to add to the initial allotment, the civil service acts
discourage exemptions and thereby push titles into classifications
3
that require testing, including the competitive class. '
A second similarity among civil service laws is the method of
appointing candidates to competitive classification positions.
Candidates for competitive positions in first and second class cities
must successfully complete practical examinations and gain entry
on a ranked eligibility list.3 2 Pennsylvania civil service law limits a
hiring authority's access to the competitive eligibility list. Instead of
selecting from among all examination passers, the hiring authority
of the first class city must choose between the two highest-scoring
available candidates (the "Rule of Two"),3 and a second class city
hiring authority must choose from among the three highest-scoring
29. The first class city law requires practical examinations modeled on the relevant
job's duties and allows for oral examinations, so long as their weight does not exceed 25% of
the final score. 53 PA CONS. STAT. § 12634 (1998). Examination score order determines
candidates' arrangement on resulting eligibility lists. Title 53, § 12634. The second class cities
law also requires practical examinations that judge merit and fitness (53 PA CONS. STAT. §
23441 (1998)) and examination score order dictates eligibility list arrangement. Title 53, §
23446.
30. TItle 53, section 12628, identifies first class cities' exempt titles and procedures and
requirements for adding additional exempt titles. Title 53, section 23444 provides the same
function for second class cities.
31. A first class city's statutorily exempt titles are department chief assistants, one
mayor-appointed secretary or clerk, and one secretary or clerk for each department. No
other titles are exempt unless the civil service commission so designates it after a public
hearing. 53 PA CONS. STAT. § 12628 (1998). First class cities employment designations also
contain an unclassified service-including, among others, elected officials, department
directors, city solicitor and assistant city solicitors, and certain contracted personnel, none
of whom enjoy civil service privileges. Ttle 53, § 12623. Second class city law mandates
exempt classification for heads of police and fire departments, one secretary and one clerk
reporting to the mayor, and one clerk reporting to each department director. 53 PA CONS.
STAT. § 23444 (1998). The second class city law also designates an unclassified service
consisting of elected officials, department heads, civil service commissioners, and those
appointed by name in any statute. Title 53, § 23439.
32. See supra note 26.
33.

53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 12635 (1998).
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available candidates (the "Rule of Three"). 4 A separate civil service
35
act for cities of the second class addresses the firefighting service.
This act requires the second class city hiring authority to appoint
the highest scoring available candidate to the firefighter vacancy
(the "Rule of One").3
In this way, municipal employee selection is a function of limited
employer discretion. Instead of perusing the full slate of available
candidates and hiring anyone who meets the qualifications, the
hiring authority may appoint only from among the highest
examination scorers or not appoint at all.37 Whether this procedure

is appropriate turns on its ability to staff municipalities with
employees who are able to meet modem local governments'
missions. Because they are outdated and contrary to modem
workplace practices, such discretion limitations are too severe to
allow local government to function effectively and should be
supplafited with a more responsive approach.
Faced with a public employment system based in large part on
patronage, 38 state legislators devised civil service systems that
reflected best-practice employment models. 39 These models were
creatures of an industrial period that valued such employee traits
as physical strength and the ability to perform repetitive actions. 40
Employees would fit into a triangular structure in which those at
the higher end managed the work processes and those at the
lower, more populous end performed tasks without straying from
34. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 23446 (1998).
35. 53 PA CONS. STAT. § 23491-23498 (1998).
36. Title 53, § 23493.1. The hiring authority may refuse to appoint the firefighter
eligibility list member with the highest examination score for written just cause. Title 53,
§23493.1.
37. See Trosky v. Civil Service Commission, 652 A.2d 813 (Pa. 1995) (to promote an
employee under the Rule of Four, the municipality must choose from among the four
highest-scoring candidates). See also Civil Service Commission v. Paieski, 559 A.2d 121 (Pa.
Conunw. 1989) (the municipality is without authority to alter the civil service-prescribed
method of promotion). A municipal hiring authority does have a degree of discretion in
original appointments. For example, a second class city hiring authority may remove a
candidate from an eligibility list after the hiring authority has, through the Rule of Three,
selected three lower-scoring candidates (53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 23442 (1998)). In addition, the
hiring authority may refuse to examine an applicant who does not meet the job's
prerequisites or who "has been guilty of any crime or of infamous or notoriously disgraceful
conduct" and for other reasons. Id.
38. See supra notes 3-36 and accompanying text.
39. Untangling Albany, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, December, 1998.
40. Joseph B. Mosca, The Restructuring of Jobsfor the Year 2000, 26 PUBuC PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT 43, at 49 (1997).
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their narrowly-defined duty lists. 41 This system compensated for
employees' low education levels and the demand for goods by
matching employees with pre-scripted, unalterable tasks, thereby
42
focusing on the product instead of the process.
Nearly a full century after the passage of early civil service laws,
including Pennsylvania's civil service laws, business operations and
perceptions of employees' worth have changed. In the modem
workplace, greater productivity and the profits associated therewith
result from turning the triangle on its head. Workplaces today
empower employees to manage work, thereby emphasizing
knowledge, learning, judgment, and innovation as opposed to
ability to follow rules and perform repetitious tasks.43 This change
in orientation reflects the recognition that increasing the work
output is a direct function of increasing the quality of personnel,
that employees are as strategic a resource as is capital, and that a
business's ability to prosper relies on its ability to hire effective
employees. 44
Employers seek employees who understand the philosophy of,
and have the skills to succeed in, the modem workplace model.
The employee finds himself or herself in a decentralized, "fields of
work" environment in which individual, narrow position
descriptions defer to the workplace's broader mission.45 The
employee is a key participant in the business or production process
and often is part of a team that requires active participation and is
vested with authority.46 Employee success, and, thus, employer
success depends on the employee's adaptability, interpersonal
skills, and willingness to learn, and not merely on a specific
47
professional- or discipline-oriented sldll.
41. GEORGE T. MILKOVICH & JOHN W. BOURDREAU, HuMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 65-68
(8th ed. 1997). See also David Carnevale, The Learning Support Model: Personnel Policy
Beyond the Traditional Model, 22 AMERICAN REvIEw OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1, March, 1992;
and America's Choice: High Skills or Low Wages! The Report of the Commission on the
Skills of the American Workforce (National Center on Education and the Economy) June,
1990, at 37.
42. See Milkovich, supra note 41, at 67.
43. Denise M. Rousseau, OrganizationBehavior in the New OrganizationalEra, 48
ANN. REV. PSYCH. 515, January, 1997. See Peter F. Drucker, Management's New Paradigms,
FORBES, October, 1998, at 151.
44. See Carnevale, supra note 41.
45. Walter C. Borman, Mary Ann Hanson & Jerry W. Hedge, Personnel Selection, 48
ANN. REv. PSYCH. 299, January, 1997; and Frank P. Cipolla, Human Resources Management In
The Federal Government, 25 THE PUBIUC MANAGER. THE NEW BUREAUCRAT 1, March 22, 1996.
46. See Carnevale, supra note 41. See also Borman, supra note 45.
47. Id.
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An example of an employer that succeeds with modem employee
systems is International Business Machines ("IBM"). Faced with a
decision of whether to manufacture needed circuit boards or
purchase the items and enjoy an estimated $60 million savings with
4
the purchasing option, IBM decided to invest in its workforce. 8
The organization restructured its processes by empowering its
employees through increased training, team formation, and
employee responsibility for quality. Successful IBM employees were
those able to adapt, interact, and use independent judgment rather
than those who excelled at a singular production duty.49 As a result,
IBM enjoyed a 200% rise in productivity, a 500% rise in quality, and
a 40% cut in inventory. °
Another example of a successful workplace utilizing modem
personnel techniques is Texas Instruments ("TI"). Realizing that
employee success is not "based on skills," TI instituted a
self-directed workforce team philosophy.51 To ensure that job
candidates will thrive in the team environment, TI screens for,
among others traits, ability to be a team player and strong
2
interpersonal skills.
The workplace refocus from employee restriction to employee
worth, dramatic at first blush, is logical in light of the last century's
advancements. Today's employers face issues unimagined by their
turn-of-the-century predecessors, including steep healthcare costs,
cultural diversity, and more extensive legal liability.5 Manufacturing
jobs have steadily given way to positions requiring employees with
enhanced education, reasoning ability, and adaptability.54 The result
is natural: as routine-based jobs make up less of the available
positions, the remaining jobs require multifaceted employees.
Furthermore, identifying a potential employee who will succeed in
a workplace demanding many skills is more difficult than is
55
identifying one who will succeed at a single task.
48. Donald Klinger, Reinventing Public Personnel Administrationas Strategic Human
Resource Management, 22 PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 565, December 27, i993.
49. Id.
50.

Id.

51. Gillian Flynn, Attracting The Right Employees and Keeping Them, PERSONNEL
JOURNAL, December, 1994, at 46.
52. Id.
53. See Klinger, supra note 48.
54. See Mosca, supra note 40, at 47. Professor Mosca notes that the United States
workforce lost 188,000 manufacturing jobs in 1996 and that machines now perform work
historically performed by employees. Id.
55. Selecting successful employees is made more difficult by the following statistics:
The United States labor force will grow one percent annually until the year 2005 (compared
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Although business practices have evolved over the last one
hundred years, the Pennsylvania legislature has remained true to
the policy of limited public employee selection discretion. This is
not to assert that local government units have remained completely
fixed in time while their private sector counterparts have raced
ahead. Nonetheless, the public today expects government to be
more responsive and to produce greater results with lessening
resources, in effect doing more with less.w In attempting to achieve
this edict, local government faces the same reality that private
business faces, that of more complex jobs.5 7 Government, however,
has been forced to navigate this reality with antiquated hiring
processes that act as impediments to improvement.58
Pennsylvania's mandated local government hiring practices are
made more restrictive by the significant weight afforded civil
service laws. It is well settled that government hiring must strictly
conform, to legislated civil service protocols. 59 Such rigidity is ill
suited to a Pennsylvania municipality's attempt to appoint the most
able candidate for two reasons. First, a municipality may not hire a
civil service candidate, even if the candidate is clearly the best
available job seeker, unless the candidate is among the top one,
two,' or three scorers. Second, a municipality's mandated reliance
on practical tests does not ensure that the best candidates will rise
to 3396 from 1975 to 1990 and 2096 from 1990 to 1995) and 2.5 million functionally illiterate
Americans join the workforce each year. See Arthur W. Sherman, George Bohlander & Scott
Snell, MANAGING HumAN REsoURcEs, 1996 at 157.
56. Stephen E. Condrey & Jeffrey L. Brudney, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct of
1990: Assessing its Implementation in America's Largest Cities, 28 AMERIcAN REvIEw OF
PuBuc ADMINISTRATION 1, March, 1998. See also Michael Brostek, Congressional Testimony
(March 12, 1998) (transcript available in Federal Document Clearing House).
57. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text. See City of Pittsburgh First to Equip
Police Force with Wireless Computers, BusiNEss WIRE, December 3, 1997 (police officer
abilities now include computer literacy) and Keith Herbert, Community Policing Institute
Introduces Its New Director, THE MORNING CALL (ALLENTOWN), February 25, 1999, at B2
(modem police officer abilities include service orientation, problem solving, and community
participation).
58. See America's Choice, supra note 41, at 54. See also David Osborne & Ted Gaebler,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT 124-30 (1993).
59. Snizaski v. Zaleski, 189 A.2d 284, 286 (Pa. 1963) (appointees did not attain civil
service status and concomitant protections when municipality failed to follow civil service
testing provisions in strict manner). See also Mafoski v. Pittsburgh, 350 A.2d 423, 425 (Pa.
Commw. 1976) ("[I]n general, civil service laws cannot be obviated by agreement," quoting
Geis' Appeal, 19 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1941) and Blawnox Council v. Olszewski, 477 A.2d 1322, 1326
(Pa. 1984) ("The provisions by which the civil service operates constitute a strict framework
of operations by which no employee may be appointed, or transferred, reinstated, or
discharged in any manner or by any means other than those specified by statutes regulating
civil service.").
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to the top of an eligibility list.
Because civil service laws prescribe municipal hiring procedures,
any deviation from appointing the highest test scorers to a vacant
competitive position results in an invalid hiring. For example, if the
fourth-highest-scoring competitive test-taker in Pittsburgh possesses
superior abilities in adaptability, interaction, and willingness to
learn, 6° the Pittsburgh hiring authority may not appoint him or her
without first appointing one of the top three scorers. This result
does not change when the fourth-ranked candidate's test score is
one percent less than the highest test score.61
When strictly applied, the Rules of One, Two, and Three as
methods for determining the best candidate are inherently flawed.
To determine appointment merit effectively with Pennsylvania
selection protocols, a competitive test must produce scores that
distinguish two test takers' ability to succeed on the job. This task
appears to be impossible. Tests often produce eligibility lists that
separate numerous candidates by only one percent. 62 However, a
test can be only so precise, and tests generally are incapable of
truly distinguishing between two candidates who are very close in
score.6 The United States Supreme Court advanced this conclusion
in Johnson v. TransportationAgency& by quoting an amicus curae
brief submitted by the American Society for Personnel
60. These are the skills sought by modem employers. See supra notes 45-52 and
accompanying text.
61. See City of Pittsburgh Eligibility List for Firefighter Recruit, posted September 24,
1998 (revised February 25, 1998) (The highest ranked candidate's score is 10096, the next five
candidates' scores are 99.5%, and the next ten candidates' scores are 99%; the eligibility list
consists of 215 candidates.).
62. Id. The top sixteen city of Pittsburgh firefighter candidates scored within one
percent of each other. See also Too Many Agencies, Too Many Rules: Reforming California's
Civil Service, Report to the Governor and Legislature, LrrLE HOOVER COMMISSION, April, 1995,
at 56 (It is common for ten to twenty candidates to share the highest examination score;
random tie breaking does not guarantee that the best candidate will achieve an appointable
rank).
63. Stephen Wollack, Confronting Adverse Impact in Cognitive Examinations, 23
PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 217, at 221, Summer, 1994. ("[I]t is statistically inappropriate
to make employment decisions based upon small differences in test scores.") See City of
Cincinnati, Steps to High Performance City Government, REPORT OF THE CITY MANAGER'S
INTERNAL REvIEw TASK FORCE, October, 1994, at 9 (promotional test scores can result in
statistically insignificant graduations). For comparative analysis, See Michael S. Moore, Three
Hours on a Saturday Morning, SF WEEKLY, December, 10, 1997 (small differences in
Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") scores are not predictive, although large differences are
meaningful predictors; consequently, the SAT test has become essentially meaningless for
admission to the University of California system (except UCLA and Berkeley) when the
applicant has attained a 3.3 high school grade point average).
64. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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Administration:
It is a standard tenet of personnel administration that there is
rarely a single, "best qualified" person for a job. An effective
personnel system will bring before the selecting official several
full-qualified candidates who each may possess different
attributes which recommend them for selection. Especially
where the job is an unexceptional, middle-level craft position,
without the need for unique work experience or educational
attainment and for which several well-qualified candidates are
available, final determinations as to which candidate is "best
qualified" are at best subjective. 65
Thus, reliance on test scores does not result in selection of the
most able candidate. Strict compliance with civil service selection
protocols is an "overrationalized personnel procedure" that falls
short of identifying the best candidate.6
Strict civil law interpretation also impedes a Pennsylvania
municipality's efforts to hire an employee with modem workplace
abilities through misplaced reliance on practical tests. Civil services
laws require that competitive tests be practical in nature,67 so civil
service tests must measure one's ability to act.68 However, modem
employee abilities consist of more than those "manifested in
practice or action;" i.e., the more technical aspects of a job.
Mounting evidence suggests that a candidate's personality and
attitude may be stronger predictors of on-the-job success than may
performance on practical skill tests.69 Employers' increasing use of
65. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. at n.17 (quoting amicus curae brief).
See also Norma M. Riccucci, Merit, Equity, and Test Validation, 23 ADMINRATION AND
SocimY 74, 76, May, 1991. Professor Riccucci states that neither the idea of merit nor the
technique for determining merit is fixed. Id. at 88. She also states that identifying through
testing the mental traits necessary for successful job performance is a difficult task. Id. at
81, citing W.R. Nelson, Employment Testing and the Demise of the PACE Exam, 33 LABOR
LAw JOURNAL 729, at 740-41, 1982.
66. See Klinger, supra note 48.
67. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 23441 (1998) (In cities of the second class, "[a]ll examinations
for positions in the classified service shall be practical in their character.. .") (emphasis
added); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 12634 (1998) (In cities of the first class, "[a]n examination shall
be free, and impartial, practical,in their character..." ) (emphasis added).
68. "Practical" refers to abilities "of, relating to, or manifested in practice or action: not
theoretical or ideal." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DIcnoNARY 914 (10th ed. 1994).
69. John A. Parnell, Improving the Fit Between Organizations and Employees, 63
SAM ADVANCED MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 25, January, 1998. Even conservative testing experts
who argue that practical skills are the most predictive benchmark of candidate success
concede that an employer should be able to include personality and attitude in the hiring
decision. Id.
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personality tests indicates increasing acceptance of such tests that
evaluate traits other than technical skills. 70 However, even if one
defines "practical" broadly, it is unlikely that personality and
attitude
evaluations
pass
"practical" muster.
Therefore,
Pennsylvania law prevents local governments from using this
significant predictive tool.
Regardless of the "practical" requirements, tests may further
restrict government employee selection. The idea of testing as a
71
reliable predictor of employee success has a significant following.
However, numerous reports conclude that testing is fraught with
problems, including tests' inability to measure job candidates'
potential, 72 tests' predictive fallibility, 73 and tests' haste in removing
a potentially strong employee. 74
Charles Darwin instructed that life forms adapt over time to
survive. Arguably a life form itself, government has also adapted to
deliver services in modem times. This adaptation may, however,
run afoul of civil service's broad purpose. Instead of consistently
following the prescribed system of testing and appointing only the
very highest scorers, governments are increasingly likely to bypass
70. The Americans Management Association survey reports that 28% of employers
currently use pre-employment personality tests; in comparison, only 19% used such tests in
1997. Sandra Livingston, Hiring the Right Personality, THE PLAIN DEALER, August 2, 1998 at
IH. Honesty is another non-technical trait that employers seek in candidates and may be a
more important success predictor than are skill tests. Peter Schragg, When Preferences
Disappear,THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, January, 1997 to February, 1997. The importance of
honesty in the screening process is illustrated by an American Society of Chartered Life
Underwriters & Chartered Financial Consultants and the Ethics Officers Association finding
that 48% of employees admit to unethical or illegal on-the-job activity. Samuel Greengard,
50% of Your Employees Are Lying, Cheating, and Stealing, WORKFORCE, October, 1997, at 46.
71. See Steven J. Cesare, A Predictive Validation Study of the Methods Used to Select
Eligibility Technicians, 22 PuBuc PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 107, March, 1993 (written tests
that follow a clear methodology are predictive), and Daniel Masden, Observations and
Comments on "Reinventing Government," 24 PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 113, at 123-24
(tests at least clearly compare one candidate to another and thereby eliminate bias).
72. Mike Sager, Testing Anxiety, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 16, 1983, at 6 (a
National Education Association program development specialist reports that humans are too
complex to be susceptible to accurate testing). Because needed workplace skills evolve so
rapidly, employers must identify candidates who will be able to adapt to changing needs and
add or enhance skill sets. See Jennifer J. Laabs, Eyeing Future HR Concerns, PERSONNEL
JOURNAL, January, 1996, at 36 (Eckerd College Human Resource Institute director predicts
employee skills will experience a one- to three-year half-life by 2005).
73. Fred E. Inbau, Integrity Tests and the Law, SECURrY MANAGEMENT, January, 1994
(citing an American Psychological Association conclusion that all tests include a degree of
fallibility).
74. Nora Lockwood Tooher, Aptitude Tests Work Like Signposts on a CareerPath, THE
COLUMBUs DISPATCH, July 6, 1998, at 8 (aptitude tests "don't tell the whole story" and may
disqualify one who requires more time to become proficient).
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civil service requirements and instead employ part-time, seasonal,
temporary, and exempt employees.7 5 By turning to a contingent
workforce, government merely emulates a powerful private sector
trend.76 However, by bypassing civil service appointment
requirements in this way, government forsakes the civil service's
broad purpose to serve as "a complete and exclusive system for the
appointment, promotion, reduction,
transfer, removal,
or
reinstatement of all officers, clerks, laborers, and other employees.
"77

Local government is consistently chastised for its bureaucratic
procedures and slothlike response to citizens' needs. 78 Such
criticism is inevitable, in part because the Pennsylvania legislature
forces once defendable, but now outmoded, hiring systems on
municipalities that are expected to satisfy modem expectations.
The governmental hiring process is akin to a private company's
appointing a computer programmer solely because she has the best
spreadsheet skills; while recognizing her practical ability to
produce a computer document (which she will do only 30% of the
time), this selection ignores the required workplace abilities of
leadership, adaptability, judgment, teamwork, and inter-personal
communication. The private sector would not accept this myopic
mode of selection, and Pennsylvania citizens should reject the same
process in government employee appointment.
Reforming outmoded civil service selection procedures is a
75. Donald Klinger & Dahlia Bradshaw Linn, Beyond Civil Service: The Changing Face
of Public Personnel Management, 26 PuBuc PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 157 (1997). See also The
Law of Patronage at a Crossroads, 12 JOURNAL OF LAW & PoLrIcs 341 (Spring, 1996) (the
Illinois Department of Transportation bypassed civil service requirements by hiring highway
maintenance workers for six-month contracts, claiming the workers to be non-career
employees and thus not covered by civil service appointment law); Jay Evenson Don't Allow
Merit System to Obstruct Good Government, THE DESERT NEWS, October 12, 1997 (to avoid
the civil service system, the Georgia Department of Transportation fudged job titles and job
requirements). Pennsylvania courts have distinguished between full-time, career-oriented
employees and part-time employees (Milisits v. City of Pittsburgh, 695 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa
Commw. 1997)).
76. Towers Perrin research indicates that 2096 of the workforce consists of temporary
employees, a figure expected to grow to 3396 by 2004; temporary employees allow an
employer "to respond to an ever-changing marketplace." Shari Caudron, Contingent Work
Force Spurs HR Planning,PERSONNEL JOURNAL, July, 1994 at 53. For an argument in favor of
government emulation of private sector practices, see Kristi Cameron, Joan Jorgenson &
Charles Kawecki, Civil Service 2000 Revisited: Old Assumptions-New Facts and Forecasts,
22 PUBLC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 4, December, 1993; for an argument against government
emulation of the private sector, see Madsen, supra note 71.
77. Gresock v. City of Pittsburgh, 698 A-2d 163, 167 (Pa. Comrnmw. 1997) quoting 53 PA.
CoNs. STAT. § 23461 (1998).
78. See Hard Truths/Tough Choices, supra note 2, at 1, 4.
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daunting task, but several government units have achieved
success. 79 The states of California, Minnesota, and Virginia, as well
as the municipal governments of Baltimore, Dallas, Indianapolis,
and San Diego have rejected the "Rule of Three" and substituted
increased hiring authority discretion and responsibility.80 New
Jersey Governor Whitman suggested replacing the "Rule of Three"
with a "Rule of Ten" and further recommended allowing local
government to opt out of civil service. 81 Perhaps the largest-scale
civil service reform occurred in Georgia, where the state legislature
disbanded civil service in its entirety for all newly-hired
82
employees.
This comment suggests that the Pennsylvania legislature amend
the various civil service laws to allow banding, a technique that
combines candidates with close test scores into one unit from
which the hiring authority may appoint any member. 3 This
recommendation is less drastic than is the deathblow Georgia
legislation, an approach that is inconsistent with Pennsylvania's
ingrained civil service tradition.84 It does, however, remove the
statistically inappropriate barriers to appointing candidates who are
best able to succeed and enable government hiring officials to
include modem workplace competencies in selection analysis.
Banding offers a methodology geared to employer and candidate
fairness and selection reliability. Recognizing that small test scores
differentials are insignificant predictors of job candidates' success,
banding allows the hiring authority to focus on candidates' superior
qualifications (including modem workplace competencies) as
opposed to minuscule test result differentials.8- Chief Judge J.
Clifford Wallace of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expounded
on banding's effectiveness:
Banding is premised on the belief that minor differences in
test scores do not reliably predict differences in job
79. Jonathan Walters, Untangling Albany, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, December, 1998, at 18
(civil service is "a monster off whose chest comprehensive reports on reform bounced like
whiffle bails -27 of them since the 1970s.")
80. Jonathan Walters, How Not to Reform Civil Service, GOVERNING MAGAZINE,
November, 1992.
81. David P. Rebovich, Politics of Civil Service Reform Rarely Too Civil, NEW JERSEY
LAWYER, May 25, 1998, at 3.
82. Evenson, supra note 75; Jonathan Walters, Who Needs Civil Service? GOVERNING,
August, 1997, at 17.
83. See Wollack, supra note 63, at 222.
84. See supra notes 7-35 and accompanying text.
85. Sims v. Montgomery County, 887 F.Supp. 1479, 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
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performance. It also recognizes that an individual is unlikely to
achieve an identical score on consecutive administrations of
the same examination. Because some measurement error is
inevitable, strict rank order promotions will not necessarily
reflect the correct comparative abilities of the candidates. The
smaller the difference between observed scores, the more
likely it is a result of measurement error, and not a variance in
job-related skills and abilities.86
There are two recognized versions of banding-"fixed bands" and
"sliding bands." The fixed bands method classifies all test scores
within a given range as equal.87 The employer determines the
ranges according to accepted testing principles, such as standard
error of measurement. 88 Each band member is qualified for the
vacant job because she has passed the examination. The hiring
authority may appoint any member of the highest available band
and may not appoint from the next highest band until the pool
from the highest available band is depleteds 9
The sliding bands method mirrors the fixed band technique in all
respects but one. When the hiring authority appoints a member of
the highest available band, the highest scoring member of the next
highest band moves into the highest band.90 Using this technique,
the hiring authority need not exhaust the highest available band
before appointing other candidates. 91
Banding enables a government hiring authority to secure a
workforce that is competent and capable by modem standards
without sacrificing historical principles of merit. Instead of being
locked into appointing the first-, second-, or third-highest scorer on
a practical test, the hiring authority may evaluate the modem
workplace competencies of a broad range of candidates who
passed a qualifying examination. 92 Whereas the current rules
prevent the hiring authority from considering some candidate
86. Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission of San Francisco, 979 F 2d 721,
723-24 (9th Cir. 1992) (banding is a valid selection technique to determine San Francisco
police sergeant and assistant inspector promotions). See Sheldon Zedeck, Use of Sliding
Bands Offers a Way to Select a Diverse Workforce, EMPLOYMENT

TESTING, March, 1996

(multiple administrations of the same examination instrument to the same test taker will
produce different scores).
87. See Zedeck, supra note 86.
88. See Wollack, supra note 63, at 222.
89. See Zedeck, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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because of testing imprecision, banding removes testing's knockout
effect. 93
Banding also allows a local government to focus its employment
selection. on the particular needs of its region. Modem-human
resources management requires successful organizations to
customize their hiring practices. Instead of hiring individuals who
would flourish in other organizations, the hiring authority should
appoint candidates who match the hiring organization's goals and
strategies.94 This approach is contrary to turn-of-the-century
industrial hiring (the civil service model), when employees'
cookie-cutter key attributes of physical strength and redundant-task
completion did not affect an organization's goals and strategies. To
hire employees who match a specific organization's goals and
strategies in the modem world, the hiring authority must have
some level of selection discretion and not be compelled to appoint
an ill-fitting candidate.95 Banding allows the needed discretion and,
thereby, enables the hiring authority to match a candidate's
knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics to the specific
municipality's vision.
A comparison of the legislated selection method and banding
illustrates the hiring official's greater chance of appointing a
successful employee through the latter method. The City of
Pittsburgh hires police officers by administering practical
examinations, a requirement of both selection techniques because
96
both require that eligible candidates meet baseline qualifications.
What changes is the method of appointment. Under the current
law, the hiring official must appoint one of the three highest
scoring candidates. Under banding, the hiring authority must
appoint from a group that could number as high as fifty or more
candidates (depending on the test takers' scores and the width of
the band).
The current "Rule of Three" method is rigid and virtually decides
the issue of which candidate is appointed, but it assumes one of
the three highest scorers is the best candidate for the job.
However, police officer responsibilities are not clearly capable of
being tested. Police officer duties require incumbents to engage in
complex analysis, and errors in judgment carry potentially
93.
94.

See supra notes 67-74.
Vida Scarpello, New ParadigmApproaches in Strategic Human Resources, GRouP
AND ORG NIZATION MANAGEMENT 160, June, 1994.
95. See Rousseau, supra note 43.
96. See supra note 34 and infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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catastrophic consequences. 9 7 Because they often work alone,
officers must be able to perform their duties and responsibilities
without the aid of back up; thus, the position requires independent
judgment ability. 98 It is feasible that none of the top three
examination scorers ever held a job or interacted with diverse
groups of people. It is further feasible that none of the top three
scorers have backgrounds that demonstrate success under
pressure. Regardless of these possible deficits, the "Rule of Three"
offers the hiring authority two choices: appoint one of the three or
appoint no one. Under a banding system, the hiring authority may
select from a large number of candidates with test scores that are
similar to the top three scorers. The appointment would go to one
who has a demonstrated record of maturity, self-control, judgment,
and interpersonal communication ability-all traits required of a
modem police officer.
Those who propose a careful approach to civil service reform
often cite invited patronage and government officials' inability to
make good hiring decisions as reasons for caution. 99 Banding as a
reform should satisfy cautious observers. Just as new business
practices and employee selection techniques have emerged since
Pennsylvania enacted its civil service statutes, so, too, have new
candidate and employee protections that counter banding abuse.
Banding works alongside two protections that are designed to
ward off a return to patronage. The first protection is that only test
passers may be included in a band, so the only candidates eligible
for appointment under a banding system are those with proven
qualifications for the vacant position. 1°° Banding prevents a hiring
authority from appointing an individual who lacks the basic,
practical skills to perform the job. In effect, banding will produce a
result no less acceptable than the current statutory requirement, for
97. See Anastasia M. Vey, Police Officer of N. Wildwood Crest, 639 A.2d 718, 718 (N.J.
1994).
98. Lanning v. S.E.P.T.A., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9388 (W.D. Pa- 1998), at 9-10. See
Thnothy Egan, New Faces, and New Roles, for the Police, THE NEw YORK TIMEs, April 25,
1991, at Al (crime fighting activity accounts for only four percent of police officer duty time;
the most important police officer ability is interpersonal communication).
99. See Madsen, supra note 71, at 117.
100. See Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 412 A.2d 860, 874-75 (Pa. 1980) (court accepted
that all firefighter test takers with examination scores of at least 75% were equally qualified).
Note that only those applicants who meet established position prerequisites may participate
in a civil service examination. See 53 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 23442 (1907)("The said commission
may refuse to examine an applicant . . . who is found to lack any of the established
preliminary requirements for the examination or position of employment for which he
applies . . .").
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both techniques compel appointment of a candidate with a high
test score.
The second protection against a return to patronage is settled
spoils case law. The Elrod 0 1-Branti'02 -Rutan'03 trilogy, each
decided long after the patronage debate had produced civil service
systems, severely limits government's ability to inject spoils into the
hiring process. In holding that government employees' First
Amendment rights trump government's political patronage rights,
Elrod and Branti provided a cause of action for government
employees who are terminated for their political affiliations. 10 4
Rutan extended the availability of the cause of action to
politically-motivated government hiring.10 5 These protections subject
government hiring decisions to scrutiny and act as a shield against
abuse.
Banding itself does not produce hiring results that discriminate
based on applicants' race or gender and does not shield
government employers from anti-discrimination mandates. Because
discrimination case law is so well developed, it is unlikely that a
government employer could successfully use a test administration
and subsequent banding-produced appointment to surreptitiously
10 6
prefer candidates on the basis of race or gender.
An example of the scrutiny associated with judicial review of
preference-based hiring is Quirin v. City of Pittsburgh. 10 7 When the
City of Pittsburgh attempted to prefer females for firefighter
positions regardless of their competitive eligibility list rank, a male
brought suit in federal court alleging unlawful gender
101. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
102. Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
103. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
104. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372-73 (1976); Branti, 445 U.S. at 514-15 (1980). Note that First
Amendment protection does not extend to policy-making government employees, who may
be terminated at will for political reasons. Elrod, 427 U.S. 376-68, 372.
105. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 79 (1990).
106. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) and progeny. A prima
facie employment discrimination case exists when an employer denies a job to a qualified
protected group member who applies for the job and hires a non-protected group member.
In such a case, the employer must then show non-discriminatory reasons for the hiring
decision, which the denied candidate may refute as a pretext. See also Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) and progeny (an employment examination must be "shown to
bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was
used"); City of Richmond v. J.R. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (racial classifications must
result from a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve the result); Police
Ass'n of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1170 (5th Cir. 1996) (using a banding
system solely to promote affirmative action "eviscerate[s]" the banding system).
107. 801 FSupp. 1486 (W.D. Pa. 1992).

1999

Loosen the Shackles

discrimination. 01 8 The court held in his favor, finding that the city
failed to prove a history of firefighter gender discrimination and
that evidence showed that few females applied for firefighter
positions, the associated examination was job related, and the
veterans' preference caused the hiring disparity. 1°9 Integral to the
court's holding was that the city's method was too "extreme" (i.e.,
not narrowly sufficiently tailored) to remedy any possible gender
discrimination. 10
The Quirin case, at minimum, stands for the proposition that
race or gender preferences in hiring must satisfy extensive judicial
examination. Although banding allows a level of appointment
discretion, and with discretion comes a potential for race or gender
preferences, the availability of a cause of action for discrimination
is strongly entrenched and should provide a proper shield against
discriminatory hiring.
In conclusion, Pennsylvania's local government units are asked to
meet the demands of society while utilizing fewer resources. To
satisfy these demands, government entities require an able
workforce. However, because the legislated civil service hiring
methods do not reflect modem human resource practices,
Pennsylvania governments do not possess the ability to ensure that
effective employees are charged with delivering government
services.
Banding is a hiring technique that respects the traditional
Pennsylvania public service notions of merit employment. By
making only a minor change to existing law, banding will produce
a full-functioning, broad-skilled municipal workforce that will be
better able to provide public service.
John W. Lasky

108. Quirin, 801 F.Supp. at 1487.
109. Id. at 1490-91.
110. Id. at 1492.

